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This article analyses the role played in world trade by 
the main countries of Latin America during the 
period 1965-1987. The analysis is based on a 
reclassification of commercial trends which shows 
both the intensity of use of the factors concerned and 
the technological content of these trends. Also, by 
constructing an indicator showing the contribution 
to the trade balance, we can compare the patterns of 
international specialization of the region as a whole 
and of each country in particular, as well as the 
changes made in those patterns as a result of the 
trade and exchange policies applied during the last 
two decades. 
With the data produced and assembled for this 
analysis, we can describe in detail the principal 
phenomena at the root of the current crisis. These 
phenomena include the technology gap in Latin 
America's specialization in relation to the developed 
countries and the newly industrialized countries, the 
bias against exporting on the part of the primary 
sectors and manufacturers who use natural resources 
intensively, the loss of dynamism towards the end of 
the 1970s by the sectors initially more successful, and 
the inefficiency of the mechanisms for allocating 
scarce resources. 
The data obtained also reveal that these 
countries have been able to specialize and achieve 
major technological advances during recent decades. 
However, these trends could be reversed if they 
adopt policies of indiscriminate openness solely in 
order to improve the relative performance of the 
primary sectors and if they neglect the potential for 
regional integration, the generation of dynamic 
comparative advantages, and the experience 
acquired during the long period of inward-looking 
development. 
•Economist. Associate Expert from the Government 
of Italy. Economic Development Division of ECLAC. 
The author is grateful to Juan José Pereira for his 
invaluable collaboration, and to Oscar Altimir, Eugenio 
Lanera and L.K. Johnson for their comments. 
Introduction 
The neo-Schumpeterian view of technological, 
organizational and entrepreneurial innovation 
as the most dynamic element in economic 
growth has become established in economic 
policy and entrepreneurial strategy in the 
immense majority of the countries of the world. 
It no longer applies only to the West. This new 
dominant paradigm could be summarized, from 
the viewpoint of the developed countries, as the 
functional relationship between the growth rate 
of income and the rate of introducing new 
products and technologies or new organizational 
techniques. 
On the other hand, especially in the Latin 
American countries, the growth rate of the 
product has been related historically to the 
constraint on the balance of payments, the two 
main components of which —the trade balance 
and the capital account— have evolved in a 
highly asymmetrical fashion because of the 
region's external indebtedness. The lost decade 
of the 1980s has clearly shown the harmful 
effects of efforts to export accompanied by a 
decline in imports of capital goods and 
investment. It has also shown that, if the 
problem of the external debt is to be finally 
solved, the debt must be radically redefined.1 
Nevertheless, in view of the structural nature of 
this crisis, it would be wrong, in the medium and 
long term, to concentrate exclusively on the 
financial imbalances of the economic relations 
between Latin America and the developed 
countries. The main impediment to the 
reactivation of the Latin American economies 
continues to be the limit imposed on growth by 
the real component of external relations. 
Understanding and redefining that component 
is one of the high-priority tasks for public and 
private authorities in these economies. 
Most interpretative theories of international 
trade have centred on the differences between 
countries with commercial relations. Thus, the 
•See ECLAC, Latin America and the Caribbean: options to 
reduce the debt burden (LC/G.1605(SES.23/5)), Santiago, Chile, 
1990, where it is stated that, in the absence of significant measures 
on the part of the creditor countries, the only solution would be for 
the debtors to declare a unilateral moratorium. 
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neo-classical tradition has emphasized the initial 
factor endowment of the different countries; the 
neo-Ricardian tradition has emphasized the 
differences in production costs and technology; 
the neo-Marxians and structuralists have 
emphasized the institutional differences that 
determine the specific structures of the labour 
and goods markets and the specific ways in 
which they operate and seek to achieve a balance 
(as well as their effects on income distribution); 
the neo-Keynesians have emphasized the 
differences in the income elasticities of the goods 
in which the different countries specialize.2 
On the basis of this diagnosis and conceptual 
framework, the principal aim of this study is to 
examine, from a technological viewpoint the 
more important trends in the international trade 
of the main countries of Latin America, over a 
period of more than two decades. This examina-
tion will be systematic and integral; it will con-
stitute a synthesis but will be rich in detail. 
With the help of these new empirical ele-
ments, as well as their elaboration resulting 
from our analysis, we aim to examine a series of 
trends of crucial interest for qualitative évalua-
Our study is based on a reclassification of trade 
flows in which different categories are 
introduced. Thus, besides the analytical 
categories that distinguish between trade in 
primary products and trade in manufactures, we 
use technological categories, which allow us to 
combine some of the different approaches to 
international trade. 
2
 Income elasticity is also one of the main elements of structu-
ral analysis, particularly the analyses of Prebisch and ECLAC. 
'An excellent summary and bibliography of the principal 
theoretical contributions to this discussion can be found in Martin 
Fransman, "Conceptualising technical change in the Third World 
in the 1980s: an interpretative survey", The Journal of Develop-
ment Studies, vol. 71, No. 4, London, July 1985. Also see Carl 
Dahlman and Francisco Sercovitch, "Exports of technology from 
tion of economic progress in the Latin American 
countries. In particular, we shall consider the 
differences in factors and their costs, the tech-
nology gap and the different income elasticities 
of the products traded. The developing countries 
are exporting their technology —the values of 
which are weighted in the study with those of 
imports— mainly because of the following 
advantages:3 
—Cost advantages implied by producing 
with the same process the same kind of product 
or service as the developed countries (for exam-
ple, lower wages for equally skilled workers); 
—Advantages based on the production of an 
adapted or obsolete good or of a technical service 
more appropriate for the needs of the user (for 
example, smaller scale and/or greater knowl-
edge of a similar market); 
—Advantages of experience derived from 
lower costs or greater knowledge, generally from 
a natural advantage, as, for example, the availa-
bility of a specific raw material; 
—Advantages resulting from the introduc-
tion of technological innovations. 
The result, which can be seen in detail in 
table 1, was a classification4 which, in the first 
place, divides manufactures into two main 
categories: those based on natural resources and 
those that are not. This division reveals the 
existence of an intermediate stage between 
primary products and manufactures. It defines a 
border area between the two that would have 
semi-industrialized economies and local technological develop-
ment", Journal of Development Economics, vol. 16, No. 1-2, 
September-October 1984. 
4
 For a detailed list of the breakdown by sectors and products 
of each category, see the study done by the author of this article, 
"América Latina: especialización y sector externo. Un análisis de 
las tendencias tecnológicas del comercio", which will be published 
soon by ECLAC. 
I 
Methodology 
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otherwise remained unnoticed and that conceals 
the presence of crucial interdependencies in 
developing economies. 
Second, for manufactures based on natural 
resources, we defined three subcategories that 
reproduce the structure 'of the classification of 
primary products; for the subcategory of 
agricultural products, we also indicated the use 
intensity of the factors of capital and labour. 
In the category of manufactures not based on 
natural resources, we opted to apply 
classification criteria that take into account the 
criticism of the concept of the homogeneity of 
the productive factors, namely, the criticism 
arising from neo-factorial theories.5 By dividing 
the labour factor into two categories —skilled 
and unskilled— we introduced a new subdivision 
between established and new industries, which 
also incorporates a qualification that can be 
related to the product cycle theory.6 On the basis 
'On the basis of the famous paradox of Wassily W. Leontief, 
"Factor proportions and the structure of American trade: further 
theoretical and empirical analysis", Review of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 38, No. 4, November 1956, research has been 
developed that tends to distinguish the different qualities of the 
labour factor. Its main representative has been Donald B. Kessing, 
"Labour skills and comparative advantage", American Economic 
Review, vol. 56, No. 2, May 1966. 
Investment in human capital as a determinant of growth has 
been incorporated by several models that postulate the existence of 
a sector specialized in producing that resource. See Patricio Mujica 
and Jorge Marshall (consultants), Conocimiento y crecimiento 
económico. Un marco alternativo para el análisis de los 
determinantes del desarrollo económico. (Knowledge and 
economic growth. An alternative framework for analysing the 
determinants of economic development) (LC/R.826), Santiago, 
Chile, ECLAC, 1989. 
6The literature on this question is ample and well known. 
Therefore we will limit ourselves to the more important 
representatives of this international trade theory. M.V. Rosner, 
"International trade and technical change", Oxford Economic 
Papers, vol. 13, No. 3, London, Oxford University Press, October 
1961; Raymond Vernon, "International investment and 
international trade in the product cycle", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 80, No. 2, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
May 1966, and Raymond Vernon, The Technology Factor in 
International Trade, New York, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1970. 
In the context of our classification, we should mention above 
all the work of Seev Hirsch, Location of Industry and International 
Competitiveness, 1961. 
The sectoral groupings were elaborated on the basis of 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
International Comparative Advantage in Manufacturing. 
Changing Profiles of Resources and Trade, Vienna, 1986, United 
Nations publication, sales No. E.85.II.B9. See also UNIDO, 
Changing Patterns of Trade in World Industry: an Empirical Study 
on Revealed Comparative Advantage, New York, 1982, United 
Nations publication, sales No. E.82.II.B.1. 
of this subdivision, we divided each group of 
industries into two subgroups according to the 
degree of use intensity of capital and unskilled 
labour. 
Finally, in an attempt to make a new 
distinction dealing more directly with the capital 
factor (in a broad sense) and the labour factor in 
its more skilled component, we divided each 
subgroup into three categories, according to 
research and development expenditures 
incurred by the different industries.7 
Table 1 gives the final classification we are 
proposing. As can be observed, the 17 final 
categories represent a rather high degree of 
disaggregation we must therefore use indicators 
that summarize trade performance and make it 
possible to define the lines of specialization. At 
the same time we must be able to make a rapid 
comparison between different countries. This 
need was met by using a fixed scheme for 
elaborating and analysing the data, which in this 
paper was reduced to the indicator of the 
contribution to the trade balance.8 
Obviously, this classification has selective 
elements because we are trying to make 
compatible and put into practice different 
theoretical frameworks. Nevertheless, it has the 
advantage of eliminating several of the 
limitations that affect each of the categories in 
itself, i.e., it does not constitute a simple 
algebraic sum of its parts. However, both for 
technical reasons (with reference, for example, 
to the type of trade classification, the 
disaggregation of the data base used, or to the 
empirical studies of Latin American technology 
and production), as well as for reasons dealing 
basically with levels of aggregation used 
7
 For this purpose we used a classification of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which 
divides industrial activities into three groups (low, medium, and 
high) according to their technological content, which depends in 
turn on the effort they put into research and development (R&D). 
Studies of the role of R&D in international trade began with 
the work of William Gruber, Dileep Mentha and Raymond 
Vernon, "The R&D factor in international trade and international 
investment of United States industries", Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 75, Part I, Chicago, Illinois, University of Chicago 
Press, 1967. 
8
 For an analytic discussion of this indicator, see Barbera 
( 1990), op. cit. However, the field of variation of this indicator for 
each sector is between 100 (total specialization) and -100 (total 
external dependence). 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: RECLASSIFICATION OF TRADE FLOWS 
Variables 
Categories 
Natural resources Skilled labour Capital unskilled labour Research and development 
Manufactures-
-> Industries not based on 
natural resources • 
Industries based on 
->• natural resources — 
- • Established 
Agriculture 
Primary products • I—• Non-combustible minerals 












low technological content 
medium technological content 
low technological content 
medium technological content 
low technological content 
medium technological content 
high technological content 
low technological content 
medium technological content 











Source: Elaborated by the author. NO 
o 
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(between three and four digits), this proposal9 is 
based on the assumption that, within each 
category, given the degree of disaggregation 
with which we worked, the products that belong 
The external constraint on growth in the Latin 
American countries first became clear from the 
amount of freedom given to industrial-
development policies by the foreign-exchange 
flows generated by exports of primary products. 
Throughout the period studied, these 
products continued to comprise the largest share 
of exports from Latin America, while the 
manufacturing sector, the internal driving force 
of the substitution strategy, failed to generate an 
equivalent impetus on the external front, i.e., an 
export flow that would allow it to pay for its 
imports of inputs and capital goods. The 
manufacturing sector was also unable to reduce 
its technological dependence on the exterior nor 
the consequent outflows of capital (as payment 
for production services, royalties, patents and 
profits). The external quantitative dimension of 
this process can be represented by the trend 
between 1965 and 1983 in both the average 
annual nominal growth rate (in current values) 
and of the real growth rate (in constant values at 
1980 prices) of the region's exports and imports. 
The nominal values (figure la) indicate that 
the region's positive performance throughout 
the 1965-1983 period was the result of a deficit-
9
 Other taxonomy proposals for typologies were also used and 
attempts were made to render them compatible —particularly 
Keith Pravitt, "Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a 
taxonomy and theory", Research Policy, vol.13, No. 6, 
Amsterdam, December 1984. But, given the particular 
characteristics of the Latin American economic systems —which 
generate practically no technology— we concluded that they 
cannot be analysed with schemes elaborated on the basis of 
observations of developed economies and their technological 
circuits. 
10AU the statistics used in this study were elaborated by the 
author on the basis of data in current and constant 1980 values 
from the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS). 
The countries considered are Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Data' from 
1965-1970 do not include Uruguay. 
to each sector and the different sectors between 
themselves have homogeneous and stable 
technological characteristics throughout the 
period analysed. 
based11 trend in the first two five-year periods 
considered, and of a surplus-based trend between 
1975 and 1983. However, from 1982 onward, the 
trend is recessive; it is characterized by a sharp 
drop in both imports and exports. Consequently, 
it cannot be interpreted as a lasting modification 
of a historical trend but rather as a drastic short-
term response of the trade balance to the need to 
make prompt factor payments on current 
account. 
Considered in real values, the situation is 
quite different (figure lb) and is explained to a 
large extent by the positive trend in the region's 
terms of trade as a net oil exporter. 
In the 1965-1970 period, the average annual 
real growth rate of imports of the Latin Ameri-
can countries as a whole was almost treble the 
corresponding rate of exports. This structural 
imbalance acquired alarming dimensions 
between 1970 and 1975, a period in which 
imports reached an annual growth rate —in real 
terms— of 6.2%, while exports fell sharply by 
an annual rate of 8.7%. This situation began to 
change in 1975. That year saw the beginning of 
the reversal of the relationship between the 
growth rate of exports and that of imports 
(3.1% and -7.0% respectively), which accom-
panied the profound and lasting crisis of the 
1980s.12 
1
 ' The term deficit-based (when in italics) refers to growth 
rates and does not necessarily imply a negative trade balance, but 
only a growth rate of imports higher than that of exports. The 
same is true, although in the opposite sense, for the use made in 
this paper of the term surplus-based. 
12
 The data base used here does not allow us to aggregate data 
from the last years of any of the countries under consideration. 
Nevertheless, this trend has grown stronger, so that the data from 
1980-1983 can be considered to represent an underestimation of 
the reversal of trade flows that took place in the region beginning 
with the external debt crisis. 
II 
Overall view of the region10 
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Figure la 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS-IMPORTS, 1965-1983 
Annual nominal growth rate (%) 
30 -i : 
- 15 1 1 r 1 — ~ — ~ T 
1965-83 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-83 
V7\ Exports E ^ 3 Imports 
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data provided by the United Nations Statistical 
Information System (UNSIS). 
As the comparison between the growth rates 
in real and nominal terms shown by the first two 
figures makes clear, during the period 1980-1983 
the terms of trade, positive up till then, also 
declined. Thus, despite the tremendous effort to 
export made in order to confront the crisis, the 
growth in the value of exports was quite small. 
Later this increased the burden of the 
adjustment.13 
In short, it can be stated that between 1965 
and 1980 —i.e., throughout the period that pre-
ceded the crisis— the development process of 
the Latin American economy generated a serious 
structural imbalance in the external accounts. 
15
 It should be remembered that the drop in the price of oil on 
international markets also contributed to the burden of the 
adjustment. 
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate this same result 
in more detail. In figure 2a the average rates of 
nominal growth of the main technological cate-
gories are compared; in figure 2b, the same rela-
tions are given on the basis of constant values. A 
comparison of the two figures allows us to make 
some comments about the effect that the 
changes in the terms of trade have had on the 
balances of payments in the region. 
Between 1965 and 1980, Latin American 
exports and imports, calculated in current 
values, evolved on the average in an almost iden-
tical fashion: exports grew at an average annual 
rate of 17.5%, while imports increased at an 
average annual rate of 18% (figure 2a). This 
equilibrium was the result of a positive trend in 
manufactures not based on natural resources and 
of a deficit-based trend on the part of primary 
products and manufactures based on natural 
resources. 
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Figure lb 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS-IMPORTS, 1965-1983 
Annual real growth rate (%) 
1965-83' 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-83 
17/1 ' Exports ÊSS3 Imports 
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data provided by the United Nations Statistical 
Information System (UNSIS). 
Figure 2b, in turn, shows that for primary 
products imports constantly tended to increase 
and exports decrease, while for manufactures 
imports grew more rapidly than exports. From 
this viewpoint, then, the trade performance of 
Latin America was markedly deficit-based. 
The terms of trade, which can be roughly 
deduced by comparing figures 2a and 2b, seem to 
have been favourable for all sectors of the region 
(with the exception of manufactures that use 
natural resources more intensively) and, in 
particular, for manufactures not based on natural 
resources. 
Regional aggregate data represent the sum 
of different trends, and consequently conceal the 
marked disparities between the performances of 
the different countries. However, these 
differences can be seen diagrammatically in 
figures 3a and 3b, which were constructed 
according to the same logic used in figures 2a and 
2b. 
The average annual rate of growth calculated 
in nominal values (figure 3a) makes it possible 
to evaluate the deficit-based trade performance 
between 1965 and 1980 of the non-oil-exporting 
countries, plus Venezuela (a country which in 
any case was close to the line of external 
equilibrium). In this period, the countries with 
the most critical performance were Brazil (in 
spite of a strong growth in exports, equal to 
18.3%), Paraguay and Argentina. 
The real growth rates (figure 3b) show a 
situation very different from the previous one. A 
perusal of them leads to the conclusion that in 
most of the countries trade relations were not in 
critical areas (i.e., those on the right of the line 
X = M). This difference is explained by the 
evolution of the terms of trade, particularly 
because of the rises in the price of petroleum 
between 1973 and 1979. 




















LATIN AMERICA: 1965-1980 
Average annual nominal growth rate of 
exports (X) and imports (M) 
Manufactures not based 
on natural resources 
X 
X > M 
Manufactures 
Manufactures intensively p 
based on natural resources 
Primary products 
X < M 
M 
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the series in current values 
of the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS). 
Figure 2b 
LATIN AMERICA: 1965-1980 
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the series in constant values 
of the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS). 
Figure 3 a 
LATIN AMERICA: 1965-1980 
Average annual nominal growth rate of exports (X) and imports (M) 
X = M 
Brazil Kl 
X < M 
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the series in currentvalues 
of the United Nations Statistical information System (UNSIS). 
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of the series in current values 
of the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS). 
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III 
The structure of Latin American trade 
1. Imports 
This section gives an overall picture of the com-
mercial exchanges of 11 Latin American coun-
tries from 1965 onward. We will first consider 
the behaviour of imports. 
Imports of manufactures (table 2) repre-
sented in 1965 85% of total imports, with the 
remaining 15% of imports of primary products. 
Imported manufactures were concentrated 
in industries not based on natural resources 
(66%), and among these, in new labour-
intensive (31%) and capital-intensive (19%) 
industries, and particularly in industries of 
medium technological content of each one of 
these subgroups (21% in labour-intensive and 
13% in capital-intensive). 
Industries based on natural resources, agri-
cultural industries —labour- and capital-
intensive— absorbed 8.8% of those imports. 
Among primary products, agricultural 
products, with 8.6%, and fuels, with 4.7%, were 
the two largest items in that same year. 
On the other hand, the growth of imports 
was accompanied by a change in their break-
down, so that in 1980, almost at the height of the 
substitution process, while the percentage of 
imports of primary products had increased, that 
of imports of manufactures had fallen by 11 
points in relation to 1965, representing 74% of 
total imports. This decline affected almost exclu-
sively the imports of the industries not based on 
natural resources, which declined from 66% in 
1965 to 54% in 1980. Within this subgroup, the 
biggest drop was registered in new labour-
intensive industries with medium technological 
content, whose imports fell from 21% to 15%. 
The decline in the other subgroups of low and 
medium technological content was quite homo-
geneous and widespread (except in capital-
intensive established industries), while the 
imports of new industries of high technological 
content increased their share to 15% of total 
imports. 
Imports of industries based on natural 
resources, to the contrary, increased their share 
by one percentage point, as a result of an increase 
of mining and petroleum derivative imports, 
and of a drop in imports of labour-intensive 
agricultural industries. 
During those same years, imports of pri-
mary products almost doubled their share (from 
15 % to 26 % ), exclusively because of the trebling 
of the weight of fuels, a change that derived both 
from the intensive process of industrialization 
undertaken by Brazil and the increases in the 
price of oil. 
The external debt crisis and the adverse 
trend in transfers of financial resources from the 
developed countries towards the countries of the 
region inaugurated the period we are now expe-
riencing, which is characterized by adjustment 
processes. 
These processes centred initially on the 
imports variable, the primary means of estab-
lishing immediate equilibrium in the current 
account. Consequently, imports fell off abruptly, 
especially in the years immediately after the cri-
sis, as was clearly shown by the drop in imports 
of manufactures of more than 40% in current 
values (table 2). 
This reduction modified the breakdown of 
Latin American imports in relation to imports of 
primary products, which came to represent in 
1983 a third of total imports, as opposed to much 
smaller percentages during the preceding 
period. 
Among imports of manufactures not based 
on natural resources, the largest decline took 
place among capital-intensive industries, both 
established and new. The breakdown of new 
labour-intensive industries changed signifi-
cantly due to a persistently strong decline of the 
component with medium technological content, 
which dropped to 13% in 1983, and to the 
increase of the component with high technologi-
cal content, which reached 11 % that same year, a 
modification all the more notable as the former 
was more than double the latter during the 
1970s. 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: SPECIAUZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR IMPORTS 
BY CATEGORY OF GOODS AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTENSITY 








































Low technological content 
Medium technological content 
Established capital-intensive 
industries 
Low technological content 
Medium technological content 
New labour-intensive industries 
Low technological content 
Medium technological content 
high technological content 
New capital-intensive industries 
Low technological content 
Medium technological content 
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Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of figures from the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS) and from the condensed data bank on foreign trade (COMTRADE). 
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2. Exports 
Table 3 shows the evolution of Latin American 
exports during the period 1965-1983. A particu-
larly striking change in their breakdown is the 
increase of exports of manufactures, which rose 
from 34% in 1965 to 46% in 1983. 
At the same time, exports of primary 
products dropped from 66% to 53%, due to a 
reduction by half of the share of agricultural 
exports (from 36.4% to 17.3%), the sharp 
decline of mineral exports (from 7% to 4%), 
and the strong increase of the export quota for 
fuels (from 22% to 32%), especially due to the 
influence of Mexico's exports. 
The increase in exports of manufactures was 
not prompted by an important change in the 
contribution of industries based on natural 
resources. This remained practically stable at 
1. Regional breakdown 
Figure 2a shows that the growth rates of exports 
and imports for the two main sectors of the Latin 
American economy —primary products and 
manufactures— tended to be deficit-based 
during the period 1965-1980. 
First, while exports of primary products 
(traditionally the backbone of the balance of 
payments in the region) declined by an average 
annual real rate of 1.3%, imports of those 
products grew at a high annual real rate of 5.7%. 
Second, manufactures, which begin with a 
deficit, grew much less than imports. This was 
the combined effect of an overwhelming real 
growth of exports of manufactures not based on 
natural resources, which reached an average 
annual rate of 14.7% as opposed to a growth of 
imports of 6.8%, and of a markedly deficit-based 
performance by manufactures based on natural 
resources, the imports of which grew at an 
average annual rate of 6%, while exports 
remained constant in real terms throughout 
those 15 years. 
around 28%. It came rather from industries not 
based on natural resources which were the spe-
cial concern of development policies. Their con-
tribution grew more than four times, rising from 
4% to 18% during the period. Among these 
industries, the biggest increases were in exports 
of the established industries with low technolog-
ical content, both capital-intensive and labour-
intensive (these latter developed very rapidly 
during the 1970s and stabilized around 4% the 
following decade), and to exports in all the 
branches of new labour-intensive industries. 
The percentage of exports of new capital-
intensive industries also rose in the branches 
with lower technological content, although with 
some symptoms of stagnation during the 1980s. 
On the contrary, exports of industries with 
higher technological content remained stable 
throughout the period studied. 
Figure 4 provides an overview of the 
contribution to the trade balance of the different 
sectors of the Latin American economies 
between 1965 and 1980. Some rough conclusions 
can be drawn from observing its four quadrants. 
The first quadrant shows that the trade 
balance of the Latin American countries 
continued to be sustained by primary products, 
among which agricultural products (the most 
important at the beginning) and fuels came to 
have equal importance. Mineral products tended 
to decline slightly. If the contribution index is 
interpreted as the measure of the continent's 
external specialization, two clearly defined 
trends become immediately apparent: the 
noticeable decline in primary products and the 
evident and large increase in the contribution of 
manufactures. 
The second quadrant reveals that 
throughout the period the negative balances are 
concentrated in the sector of manufactures not 
based on natural resources, to such a degree that 
they determine an extremely negative index of 
sectoral contribution to global balance. 
IV 
Trade balances and sectoral contributions 
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Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1983 
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Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data provided by the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS). 
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However, the magnitude of this index 
diminished noticeably with the years, explaining 
to a large extent the variation in the 
performance of the manufacturing sector as a 
whole. 
Manufactures using natural resources 
intensively made a positive and stable 
contribution throughout the whole period. 
The third quadrant, which concentrates on 
the contribution of established industries, 
reveals some important changes. On the one 
hand, there was a surge in labour-intensive 
industries, which became the one group with a 
positive balance and a positive contribution 
among manufactures not based on natural 
resources. On the other hand, in capital-
intensive industries impressive growth marked 
the last two years, a fact which in 1983 was 
explained as a short-term result of the drop in 
imports following the crisis. 
Nevertheless, the increase in the 
contribution of established industries did not 
come from the branches with higher 
technological content, whether labour- or 
capital-intensive. 
New industries (fourth quadrant), despite 
their recovery during the 1970s, represented the 
weakest point of Latin America's external role 
and had^most of the negative balances with the 
world market, especially in the labour-intensive 
branches with higher technological content 
(table 4). 
2. Country breakdown 
Figures 5 to 1514 show separately the 
specialization of each one of the 11 countries 
under consideration, in the 10 main 
technological categories proposed (three 
primary and seven manufacturing) during the 
period 1965-1987. 
In the first quadrant of the figures, the 
contribution of the three primary sectors 
(agricultural, mining and energy) is compared 
with that of the manufacturing sectors taken 
together. The comparison brings out the 
disappointing technological and industrial role 
of trade in most Latin American countries, as 
HSee the figures at the end of this article. 
well as their persistent specialization as 
providers of primary products for the world 
economy. Only three countries (Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay) achieved a positive contribution index 
in manufacturing during the period under study. 
Brazil is the only country in which the 
manufacturing specialization became steadily 
positive and even far superior to that of the 
primary sectors during the 1980s, taking first 
place over agricultural products. 
In Chile, in turn, manufactures achieved 
levels of positive contribution already during the 
1970s (obviously due to the influence of the 
variations in the price of copper), which were 
maintained, although irregularly, up to the 
beginning of the following decade. At that point 
they were surpassed by agricultural products, 
which thus reached the top of the ascending 
curve they had followed from the beginning of 
the period and which led them to attain levels of 
contribution close to those of mining. 
In the case of Uruguay, there is a clear rising 
trend of manufacturing specialization, which, 
however, reaches levels of positive contribution 
only in the years immediately after the crisis. 
Agricultural specialization, in turn, though 
showing signs of decline, continued to be the 
most stable structural element in the external 
trade of that country. 
In two other countries (Argentina and 
Colombia) , the cont r ibut ion of the 
manufacturing sector, although constantly 
negative, tended to improve rapidly during the 
1970s, but displayed clear symptoms of 
stagnation during the 1980s. 
In some countries (Mexico up to 1985, 
Paraguay and Peru), the contribution of 
manufacturing grew during the 1970s only to fall 
during the next decade. In others it fell 
constantly (Bolivia), remained steadily negative 
(Ecuador), or barely improved (Venezuela) 
during the 1980s. 
In the second quadrant of the corresponding 
figures, the contribution trend of industries 
based on natural resources is compared with that 
of industries not based on them. 
First, if specialization in industries based on 
natural resources is examined, three main 
groups of countries can be distinguished: 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: TRADE BALANCE A N D CONTRIBUTION TO THE BALANCE 
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Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of figures from the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNS1S) and from the condensed data bank on foreign trade (COMTRADE). 
Note: Contribution = 100" {{ <xi-mi)/[(X + M)/2]) - ( (X-M) / [(X + M)/2] * [(xi+mi) / (X + M)]}} / { [X/<X + M) / ] • [1 - [(X-M) / (X + M)|] | 
X, M = Export, Import totals, xi, mi = Export, Import of sector "i". 
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—Those that present stable degrees or 
positive growth of specialization (Argentina, 
Bolivia,15 Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela); 
—Those that did not achieve positive 
contributions, despite improving their relative 
performance (Colombia and Ecuador); 
—Those that have shown a trend opposite 
to that of the region as a whole, i.e., have gone 
from significantly positive indicators to others 
markedly negative (Mexico and Paraguay). 
Second, for manufactures not based on 
natural resources, Brazil was the only Latin 
American country that successfully specialized 
internationally in this field during the 1980s. 
All the other countries —with the exception 
of Bolivia, which worsened its relative 
performance, and Ecuador, which maintained it 
practically stable— reduced their almost 
absolute lack of specialization in this field, 
especially Argentina. This progress took place, 
however, within the framework of a severe 
stagnation during the 1980s, which particularly 
affected Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. 
The third quadrant compares the 
performance of the contributions of established 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries with 
that of the corresponding capital-intensive 
industries. 
As mentioned above, the trend shown in 
figure 4, covering the whole region, conceals 
substantial differences between the countries 
studied. In fact, toward the end of the period, the 
positive contributions were concentrated, in 
descending order of size, in Uruguay, Brazil, 
Argentina,16 Peru and Colombia. Except for 
Peru, which joined this group later, the 
specialization process had in this case its most 
dynamic period during the 1960s and 1970s, 
clearly stagnating in the 1980s. 
All the other countries, on the contrary, 
present negative indicators. Some do so, 
however, within a trend towards growth, such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
Mexico, in turn, moves from a positive to a 
slightly negative contribution, especially due to 
the oil boom, while in Chile the indicators that 
"Bolivia always presents a positive indicator but, however, 
with a marked relative decline. 
l6With a significant turnaround in 1987. 
improve up to the 1970s begin to decline until 
they become negative, owing to an 
indiscriminate opening of its market together 
with an overvalued exchange rate. 
Also, in the case of established capital-
intensive industries, most of the results attained 
by the region as a whole may be attributed to the 
performance of Brazil. Brazil showed an 
impressive dynamism between the end of the 
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, but this 
appears to have quickly stagnated. However, 
Chile, owing to exports of mineral surpluses, had 
also reached, even before Brazil, a positive 
contribution in these branches, which was even 
able to recover after the sharp drop between 
1975 and 1980. 
Argentina, although its contribution was 
negative, showed a rising trend, with results very 
similar to those of the region as a whole. Ecuador 
and Bolivia —a country that followed a trend 
similar to that of Chile, but in the opposite 
direction— saw their specialization in these 
sectors plummet, while Colombia, Peru, 
Paraguay and Uruguay were unable to maintain 
the trend toward growth they had shown up to 
the debt crisis. Finally, Mexico, even in the midst 
of large fluctuations, was able to maintain and 
even slightly improve its initial level. 
The fourth quadrant of figures 5 to 15 shows 
what has already been pointed out in the analysis 
of figure 4, which represents the whole region: 
the new industries, both labour- and capital-
intensive, are the area of least specialization in 
the Latin American economies. Moreover, both 
on the regional and national level, the 
contribution indicators of capital-intensive 
industries are much less negative than those of 
labour-intensive industries. If we remember also 
the relative structural scarcity of skilled labour in 
relation to unskilled labour, so characteristic of 
Latin America, we may detect in the fourth 
quadrant of the figures a trend that is decisive for 
the style of development and its effect on the 
region's international role. We are referring 
specifically to the desire to allocate scarce 
resources precisely to the sectors that use them 
intensively. They are highly inefficient in the 
international sphere and are dominated by 
highly protectionist policies with strong 
transnational participation. This trend, 
although it helped to reduce the imports of these 
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sectors (a reduction which explains that the 
indicator for them was better than that for 
labour-intensive industries), displayed no 
capacity to generate a sustainable movement in 
terms of domestic equilibria (unemployment) 
nor in terms of external equilibrium (as seen 
from the greater dynamism of labour-intensive 
sectors). 
Brazil represents in this respect an 
exception only insofar as it was able to cross —in 
1980— the threshold of positive contribution in 
capital-intensive industries. This result was 
achieved, however, at the cost of serious fiscal 
This article concentrates on the period 1965-
1987, which includes very diverse trends in both 
Latin American and world economic history, and 
ends on the threshold of a period which seems to 
presage important political and economic 
changes. Consequently, the region's trade 
performance during this time reflects to some 
extent the tremendous instability and enormous 
variations —of a magnitude perhaps still 
unknown— to which both economic agents and 
political planners have been submitted. 
Without a doubt, the most dynamic element 
of this period was technological and 
organizational change. There is also no doubt, 
from the viewpoint of economic theory, that the 
speed with which these changes were 
disseminated disrupted the explanatory capacity 
of those theoretical models whose fundamental 
concepts were still based on the perfectly" 
competitive market, homogeneity of factors, 
perfect and free access to technology and, in the 
final analysis on the incorporation of technology 
as an exogenous parameter.17 
Despite industrial progress, the main 
obstacle to growth in Latin America during the 
17
 See Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: Technology 
and Economics, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982; 
Patricio Mujica and Jorge Marshall, op. cit., and Martin Frajisman 
(1985), op. cit. 
pressures, both direct —related mostly to the 
promotion of industry and to export subsidies— 
and indirect. It displayed moreover an early 
stagnation, especially as compared with the 
dynamism shown by those same sectors in world 
trade during the 1980s. These considerations are 
applicable to all the countries of the region 
which, even in a framework of emphatically 
negative contributions, have shown an initially 
positive trend in the performance of these 
sectors, as is the case of Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
period under consideration was the external 
constraint, which is increasingly identified with 
the technology gap (seen in trade flows) that 
separates this continent from the developed 
countries, and to a lesser extent, from some 
newly industrialized countries (NICs). 
It would be superficial to try to explain 
external performance, whose character seems to 
be more structural than short term, with 
reference exclusively to exogenous variables. 
This is so because in the medium term an open 
economic system18 should have the internal 
capacity to adapt to external changes, a capacity 
which supposedly would have to operate that 
much more quickly to the extent that the degree 
of openness was greater. Now the degree of 
openness is measured correctly not so much by 
the relative importance of trade in relation to 
production (which in most of the Latin 
American countries is not much), as by the 
decisive character of imports for the normal 
performance of all the activities of an economy, 
which is precisely what happens in the case of 
the Latin American economies. 
Indeed, the decline in imports due to the debt 
crisis, particularly of capital goods, increased and 
prolonged indefinitely the imbalances generated 
18This very characterization —openness— already repre-
sents an implicit acceptance of making the exogenous endogenous. 
v 
Evaluation and conclusions 
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by the financial variables. This laid bare the 
vulnerability of the Latin American economic 
systems and the tremendous difficulties they 
have in trying to catch up with the vigorous 
technological progress of the last two decades in 
the world economy. The countries of the region, 
which had begun to consolidate their own 
industrial position within the world economy, 
saw their original objectives of developing their 
production become increasingly unattainable, 
since they were incapable of keeping in step with 
those changes. 
The main effects of the extraordinary surge 
in the conception and application of 
technological and organizational innovations 
can be summarized very roughly on two 
principal levels. First, in the context of the 
vertical perspective of development, these 
innovations have broken down Rostow's 
sequential strategy of the stages of development. 
In terms of the hierarchy among countries, the 
rise of the NICs took place in a context of 
incorporation that extended the tendency of the 
terms of trade to deteriorate to certain products 
and industrial sectors and raised protectionist 
barriers in the developed countries. 
On the other level, in a horizontal 
perspective, the more important one in our 
judgement, the magnitude and impact of the 
new technological development produced a 
profound qualitative modification of both the 
economic systems and their rules of the game as 
well as the behaviour that was predominant in 
those systems. Given their characteristics, the 
dissemination of the new technologies left 
nothing intact. They not only created new 
products and sectors, but also had widespread 
effects on all economic sectors (from the 
primary sector to services), on the sphere of 
production and its organization (the move from 
the enterprise system to a network system), on 
distribution (management of commercial 
networks, new warehousing techniques, etc.), 
and on reproduction. And above all, with regard 
to the education and training of human 
resources, labour was no longer considered as a 
cost component and came to be considered as an 
asset both from the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic viewpoint.19 
There is a growing consensus that the main 
cause of Latin America's incapacity to handle 
these changes is the fact that the region was for 
the last 40 years the most fertile ground for 
experimenting with import-substitution 
policies,20 and also, that after a long and 
successful phase of growth, the costs of these 
policies began to outweigh their benefits. 
In this regard, the most criticized aspects of 
import-substitution policies are the systems of 
multiple exchange rates; the levels and 
dispersion of the tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(which in fact gave most of the industrial sectors 
a good deal of protection during almost 
indefinite periods, while the primary sectors 
chronically faced negative effective rates of 
protection); the systems of exemptions 
constructed in such a way that in fact they 
institutionalized different treatment for distinct 
economic agents, thus lending themselves to 
strong manipulation, and finally, the incapacity 
of the public sectors to administer such complex 
systems.21 
To sum up, these policies22 generated 
tremendous rents,23 pressure groups and 
enormous possibilities for speculation. 
Consequently the economies suffered a 
premature sclerosis, since the development 
process was unable to stimulate technological 
"For the concept of the network-enterprise, see Cristiano 
Antonelli, L'impresa-rete, CESPE Papers, No. 7, Padua, Italy, 1987, 
and by the same author, Cambiamento tecnológico e teoria 
dellïmpresa,Turin, 1982. For a summary of the presentation and a 
brilliant historical analysis of the evolution of production systems 
(market-system, enterprise-system, network-system) and of the 
concept of economies of scale, see B. Di Bernardo, Economie di 
seda, économie di scopo, économie di varieta. Il valore económico 
delia complessita, Economia e Politica Industríale, No. 61, Milan, 
1989. In this regard, we should mention the growing criticism of 
the conceptual division between production and organization 
which the penetration of the new information technologies is 
introducing into present-day industry. 
20On the origin of this process, see Andrés Bianchi and 
Toboshi Nohara, A Comparative Study on Economic 
Development Between Asia and Latin America, Tokyo, Institute of 
Developing Economies, 1988. 
2
 ' See ECLAC, Estado y desarrollo: la necesaria reconversión 
del sector público de América Latina y el Caribe (LC/R.824), 
Santiago, Chile, 1989. 
22
 For a lucid and penetrating exposition that also 
reconstitutes the basic stages of structuralist thinking, see Osvaldo 
Rosales, "An assessment of the structuralist paradigm for Latin 
American development and the prospects for its renovation", 
CEPAL Review, No. 34 (LC/G.1521-P),Santiago, Chile, April 1988. 
2
'See Anne Krueger, "The Political Economy of Rent-
Seeking Society", American Economic Review, vol. 64, No. 3, 
June 1974. 
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innovation and dissemination among these 
productive systems. They were characterized by 
a high degree of concentration and accustomed 
to operating according to a static oligopolistic 
logic of defending acquired positions, which 
were moreover passed on almost by 
inheritance.24 
In time, the joint action of these elements 
created an entrenched economic system, i.e., a 
system that is defined both by barriers and by the 
immense complementary areas which remain 
outside of it. It is following the wrong path in the 
external pursuit of the fetish of development.25 
24
 From a viewpoint of North-South international economic 
relations, this is problematic for a neo-Schumpeterian view of 
large oligopolistic enterprises as the main sources of research and 
innovation. Because in fact, even though transnational corpora-
tions have been the main source of modernization in developing 
countries, there is a clear asymmetry in the rate of dissemination of 
new technologies with the different subsidiaries of the same enter-
prises. In the context of the stagnation of many Latin American 
countries, this asymmetry has been accentuated, creating thereby a 
barrier to international markets, owing to the obsolescence of 
installed productive apparatuses. Also in some cases, the transna-
tional' capacity to appropriate more skilled human resources and 
innovations resulting from autonomous research has made it pos-
sible for them to reap the economic advantages, thus nullifying 
local efforts (and investments). 
For the mechanisms of appropriating the economic advan-
tages of technological innovations, see David J. Teece, "Capturing 
Value from Technological Innovation: Integration, Strategic Part-
nering, and Licensing Decisions", Berkeley, University of Califor-
nia, March 1986, mimeo. Teece shows how in introducing a 
determinate technological innovation different relations are estab-
lished, relations which can be classified in three different catego-
ries: assets that are cospecialized, specialized and generic. The 
more or less decisive character of such assets depends on the phase 
of the life cycle in which the innovation is found. Since rents are 
generated especially in the second phase (paradigmatic), the avail-
ability of specialized assets (which have a relation of unilateral 
dependence with respect to the innovation), will determine to a 
large extent the possibility of appropriating the economic advan-
tages of an innovation —in such a way that an imitator who 
disposes of the necessary complementary specialized assets can 
easily appropriate the rents, if the innovator disposes only of the 
cospecialized assets (which depend bilaterally on the innovation) 
and cannot then compete in that phase of development. In this 
context, the most important consequence of Teece's analysis is that-
both for promoting technological innovations and for attracting to 
a country a flow of such innovations, it is not necessary to concen-
trate efforts on only one research and development activity (which 
generates cospecialized assets), but especially on the complemen-
tary assets and their infrastructures, given that the presence of 
protective barriers in a country which offers no other complemen-
tary asset than access to its market, will in no way promote the 
innovation, but rather will only generate in the domestic market 
rents higher than those that would be generated in the world 
market (moreover prolonging them unnecessarily in time). 
25
 See Osvaldo Sunkel, "Capitalismo transnacional y desinte-
gración nacional en América Latina", El Trimestre Econômico, 
vol. 38, No. 150, April-June 1971. 
This system was also one of the main obstacles to 
the establishment in Latin America of 
multilateral free-trade agreements. These have 
never gone beyond the experimental phase or 
bilateral negotiations by product. In the same 
way, the attempt to modify Latin America's 
international role by granting subsidies to 
production and exports26 of non-traditional 
manufactured products, ended by increasing the 
burden of a public sector that already tended to 
incur deficits. It remained distorted after having 
made this effort in the midst of a blockade 
represented by high protectionist barriers and 
conspiratorial agreements to divide the rents 
generated by sales in domestic markets. 
' Within the perspective of our analysis, it is 
particularly important to emphasize that, owing 
to these rules of the game, technological 
development was incorporated only as an 
absolutely secondary variable in the strategies of 
the leaders of the Latin American economies. 
Thus, in several cases, the progress made in 
sectors of higher technological intensity turned 
out to be simply decorative, and not the result of 
technological research and development. 
The previous model was seriously 
questioned for the first time in the 1970s, and 
since that time the notable uniformity that had 
characterized Latin America's trade and 
exchange policies began to break down. Several 
countries then attempted to apply the monetary 
focus of the balance of payments, which could 
well be compared to an 180 degree turn in 
relation to import substitution. One of the key 
themes of this focus was the emphasis it placed 
26
 For a description of the instruments of these policies in 
different countries, see ECLAC, Políticas de promoción de exporta-
ciones en algunos países de América Latina ( LC/G. 1370), Estudios e 
Informes de la CEPAL series, No. 55, Santiago, Chile, 1985. 
The models of export-led growth were developed especially 
in the 1960s. Among the more important representatives of this 
view of development are Beckerman, Caves, Cornwall and Kaldor. 
A very interesting model in this regard is that of Anthony Thirwall 
and R.J. Dixon, A Model of Export-Led Growth with a Balance of 
Payments Constraint, 1979. In its more simplified version, this 
theory holds that the growth rate of the product is equal to the ratio 
between the growth rate of exports and the income elasticity of the 
demand for imports. This analysis, within the framework of 
export-led growth, has the advantage of also incorporating the 
peripheral characterization of an economy —a kind of exogenous 
linkage— whose basic feature is expressed in the divergence 
between the high income elasticity of its demand for imports and 
the low elasticity of its demand for exports. 
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on the supposed direct relationship between 
export performance and economic growth and 
on the dependence of the former on government 
policies.27 These techniques were initially 
applied by an extreme liberalization of trade 
policy along with a highly controlled exchange 
policy, which resulted in external crises and 
serious industrial deterioration, mostly because 
of freezing the exchange rate with a consequent 
overvaluat ion. Such er rors obliged the 
governments to abandon this attempt to 
liberalize,28 and to reintroduce mechanisms of 
controlled fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
Finally, with the tremendous debt crisis, 
most Latin American countries were forced by 
both external and domestic pressures to abandon 
inward-looking development strategies. Indeed, 
once the brief parenthesis of artificially 
favourable external variables created by the 
rapid and excessive process of indebtedness29 
was over and the bill was presented, the Latin 
American countries faced the paradoxical need 
to become net exporters of financial resources. 
The consequent pressure that this need 
exercised on the result of the trade balance was 
added to the difficulties the countries had in 
increasing and diversifying their exports to the 
developed countries, owing both to the trade 
barriers they met there30 and the clear 
technological gap between their productive 
apparatuses and their managerial capacities. All 
this affected the validity of economic-policy 
"See for example, Bela Balassa, "Exports and economic 
growth: further evidence", Journal of Development Economics, 
vol. 5, No. 2, June 1978. Anne Krueger, "Trade Policies as an Input 
to Development", American Economic Review, vol. 70, No. 2, 
May 1980. 
"Except for Chile. 
29
 In addition, some countries benefitted from a considerable 
recovery in their raw material export process, leading to a 
substantial improvement in their external terms of trade. 
50
 See Sam Laird and Julio Nogues, Trade Policies and the 
Debt Crisis, Washington, D.C, World Bank, September 1988; and 
Sam Laird and Alexander Yeats, Trends in Nontariff Barriers of 
Developed Countries 1966-1986, Washington, D.C, World Bank, 
December 1988. Both studies show how openness and the export 
efforts of developing countries before and after the debt crisis were 
accompanied by more protection of the developed countries' 
markets. The studies make clear, in particular, that the non-tariff 
barriers of those countries have almost doubled in the last two 
decades, thus making it difficult for exports to those countries to 
grow, especially agricultural and labour-intensive products 
(textiles, footwear). 
plans and their influence on the external 
sector.31 
On the other hand, technological progress in 
the industr ial ized countries led to an 
unprecedented rate of depreciation of the 
physical and human capital of the countries that 
did not participate in this process. Consequently, 
they faced a severe loss of competitiveness, 
aggravated by their incapacity to carry out the 
structural modifications of an institutional 
character that would have enabled them to 
develop sources from which they could create 
and disseminate new technologies.32 
The preference given by the Latin American 
countries to a closed domestic market as the 
driving force of their economic development and 
the consequent mercantilistic logic of their 
international role had been consolidated as 
strategic elements in the decisions of their 
economic leaders, and particularly those of 
transnational corporations. They were thus 
excluded from the process of internationalizing 
integrated production, which boosted the 
development of the world economy throughout 
almost the whole post-war period.33 
uSee ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1988 (LC/G.1577-P), Santiago, Chile, 1989, particularly 
section X, which analyses the relationship between the transfer of 
resources, the absorption of private debt by part of the public 
sector, devaluations, inflation and fiscal deficit. 
32
 The experience of both public and private managers of 
operating within frameworks of economic policy imposed by 
dictatorial regimes made institutional asymmetries worse, 
particularly those corresponding to the labour market and 
organizational forms. By promoting authoritarian mental 
structures and limiting the freedom of most economic actors, this 
experience contributed to the frustration of development dynamics 
and the disposition to innovate and incorporate productive and 
organizational technologies that could have existed in those 
societies. 
"In saying this, we by no means wish to take away impor-
tance from the role —which is moreover fundamental— of the 
domestic market as an initial motor of development. We want to 
highlight the insufficiency and deficiency of a logical scheme that 
begins with a correct consideration but arrives at conceptions of 
autarkic policies, transforming a necessary condition into a suffi-
cient condition. This limitation was also presented in liberal 
orthodoxy concerning export-led growth, with respect to the eva-
luation of free trade as a necessary and sufficient condition of 
development, as was clear, for example, in the first comparisons 
between the countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America. See, 
for example, Anne Krueger, "Export-led industrial growth recon-
sidered", Trade and Growth of the Advanced Developing Coun-
tries in the Pacific Basin: Papers and Proceedings of the Eleventh 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference, W. Hong and 
C.B. Krause, Korea Development Institute, 1981. 
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From these premises and the recession of 
the domestic markets (the main attraction for 
foreign investors), the Latin American countries 
were forced to compete with other developing 
countries for their own place in the world 
economy. 
After the shortcuts taken as a result of the 
compression of real wages and the severe fiscal 
crises of the States, other possible roads to inte-
grated development still have to be conceived, 
this time really viable, since in terms of dyna-
mism, the technological revolution has also 
meant opening up new ways of participating in 
the world economy, increasing possibilities 
through greater market diversification and seg-
mentation. Such possibilities are much more 
extensive than can be imagined on the basis of 
the sole aspiration —legitimate but limited— of 
returning to the primary sectors their previous 
importance by eliminating the distortions that 
had so powerfully blocked their development. 
This is true because a strategy of international 
participation based solely on the intensive 
exploitation of static comparative advantages 
(the vast majority of which are dependent on 
absolutely natural advantages and on a strong 
compression of real wages) can be viable in the 
short term —however, at what social and envir-
onmental cost?— but does eliminate the need to 
generate dynamic comparative advantages, the 
only ones which, given the current state of the 
world economy, can support a process of sus-
tained and stable growth over time.34 
At the beginning of the 1990s, exchange and 
trade policies are once again among the top 
priorities of all the countries in Latin America. 
Similarly, most of the countries of the area have 
clearly modified —or are in the process of 
modifying— the basic principles that guide their 
policies, moving from protection to free trade.35 
As they strive to attain their two major 
objectives, democracy and modernization, which 
34See Fernando Fajnzylber, "International competitiveness: 
agreed goal, hard task", CEPAL Review, No. 36 (LC/G.1537-P), 
Santiago, Chile, 1988, and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Generación de 
ventajas comparativas y dinamismo industrial (LC/R.559), 
Santiago, Chile, 1988. 
"We should mention in this regard the parallel process of 
deregulating foreign investment and the growing use of debt-
conversion mechanisms. 
symbolize their aspirations towards both social 
justice and sustained and stable economic 
growth, the Latin American countries uniformly 
accept the need to open up their economic 
systems. In the face of this unanimity, which may 
lead some countries to resolve all their 
uncertainty by adopting a new fatalistic 
dogmatism,36 it is important to observe closely 
and remember what has happened to their trade 
over the last 20 years from the viewpoint of their 
external technological relations. Thus, we can 
understand that in reality there is no single 
answer (as is evident if, for example, we 
compare the performance of Brazil with that of 
Chile), and that each country has to find its own 
technological path and not follow the latest 
fashion. 
In seeking to redefine these external 
relations, governments must have the real will 
and capacity to modify at least one of the more 
notable characteristics of their trade and 
exchange policies. This is their excessive 
complexity. Instead of achieving a superior 
rationality, this complexity is simply chaotic. 
This state of affairs, rather than the logical 
deficiencies of the import-substitution model, 
constitutes at this particular time the best reason 
for undertaking the urgent task of drastically 
revising the economic policies of the Latin 
American countries. Their policies can only be 
modified by respecting the basic principle of 
having economic-policy instruments that are 
manageable, known, and as transparent as 
possible. These features coincide moreover with 
the desire for democratization on the continent, 
since with an unintelligible system, the only ones 
who win are those who have a particular kind of 
knowledge that allows them to increase their 
rate of profit by damaging the efficiency of the 
economic system in general. 
Nevertheless, even though clarity is needed 
to eliminate the recognized defects of previous 
policies, it is also necessary not to confuse 
simplicity with a vacuum, and to let this vacuum 
take the place of previous policies, thus leaving 
the function of guiding and planning the use of 
social resources to the State. Only by modifying, 
but also by capitalizing on existing resources and 
56
 Read laissez-faire. 
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investing more in them, can the dangerous (and 
socially non-viable) temptation be avoided of 
beginning from zero. 
In this regard, the developing countries can 
adopt two main technological strategies37 for 
trying to close the gap that separates them from 
the developed countries, with respect not only to 
growth but also to well-being. The first aim is to 
try to reach the frontiers of technological 
development; the second is to use available 
technological advances without trying to 
generate them, except over the long term.38 
Even though the dissemination of 
innovations is indispensable for achieving any of 
these objectives, we must not only take full 
advantage of the national differences that 
facilitate a better international role, but we must 
also reduce the most characteristic asymmetries 
of the peripheral economic systems. These 
include particularly the internal duplications and 
the institutional framework of the labour and 
"SeeJ.S. Metcalfe and Luc Soete, "Notes on the Evolution of 
Technology and International Competition", Manchester 
University, mimeo, 1983, and David Teece (editor), The 
Competitive Challenge. Strategies for Industrial Innovation and 
Renewal, Cambridge, 1987, and the interesting model of 
M. Cimoli, G. Dosi and L. Soete, "Innovation diffusion, 
institutional differences and patterns of trade: a North-South 
model", mimeo, a document presented at the Conference on 
Innovation Diffusion, Venice, 17-22 March 1986. 
38
 See also Dieter Ernst and David O'Connor, Technology and 
Global Competition. The Challenge for Newly Industrialising 
Economies, Paris, OECD, 1989. 
goods markets in which there is direct 
competition with developed countries. Finally, 
we must ensure that productive structures (and 
not only demand) converge towards a better 
income elasticity. 
Likewise, it will be of fundamental 
importance to condition the renegotiation of the 
external debt on a greater openness of the 
developed countries' markets. 
Given the current situation in Latin 
America, it would seem advisable to adopt the 
second strategy. This would take advantage of 
existing innovations, accompanied by 
institutional measures —general and sectoral— 
and investment measures which would facilitate 
and increase the dissemination and adaptation of 
innovations.39 
Even though the Latin American economic 
crisis will surely continue to be exceptional, both 
for its magnitude and duration, it is no less 
certain that Latin America has been able to 
elaborate over several decades of development 
its own learning curve, the fruit of a long process 
of accumulating knowledge. We can advance 
much more easily from this knowledge than 
from the depths of false dogmas. 
"For a more detailed discussion of the policies, see ECLAC, 
Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity. The Prime Task 
of Latin American and Caribbean Development in the 1990s 
(LC/G.1601-P), Santiago, Chile, 1990, United Nations publication, 
sales No. E.90.II.G.6. 
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Figure 5 
ARGENTINA: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1987 
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Figure 6 
BOLIVIA: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 19651984 
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Figure 7 
BRAZIL: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 19651985 
MANUFACTURES AND PRIMARY 
PRODUCTS 
MANUFACTURES: RESOURCE-BASED AND 
NON-RESOURCE-BASED INDUSTRIES 
1966 1970 1976 1980 1963 1964 1966 1966 1970 1976 1980 1983 1984 1986 
ESTABLISHED LABOUR- OR CAPITAL-





1966 1970 1976 1980 1963 1984 1986 1966 1970 1976 « 8 0 1983 1984 1986 
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data provided by the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS). 
98 CEPAL REVIEW No. 41 / August 1990 
Figure 8 
COLOMBIA: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1985 
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Figure 9 
CHILE: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1985 
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Figure 10 
ECUADOR: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1984 
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Figure 11 
MEXICO: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1985 
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Figure 12 
PARAGUAY: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1985 
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Figure 13 
PERU: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1984 
MANUFACTURES AND PRIMARY 
PRODUCTS 








1966 1970 197E 1980 1983 1984 
-80 
1966 1970 1976 1980 1983 1984 
ESTABLISHED LABOUR- OR CAPITAL-
INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 
NEW LABOUR-OR CAPITAL-INTENSIVE 
INDUSTRIES 
-26 
1966 1970 1976 1980 1983 1984 1966 1970 1976 1980 1983 1984 
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data provided by the United Nations Statistical Information System (UNSIS), 
104 CEPAL REVIEW No. 41 / August 1990 
Figure 14 
URUGUAY: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1970-1987 
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Figure 15 
VENEZUELA: SPECIALIZATION AND EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1965-1983 
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